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NOTE
The Quality of Mercy Is Not Strained: Interpreting the
Notice Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Ann McGuire
What need the bridge much broader than the flood?
The fairest grant is the necessity.
Look, what will serve is fit.1

INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 {FfCA),2 the
United States is liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."3
This limited waiver of sovereign immunity,4 subject to certain ex
ceptions,5 grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over
civil tort actions against the United States for money damages.6
The Act requires a claimant suing the United States to file her
claim first with the appropriate administrative agency.7 If the
agency denies the claim, it mails a notice of final denial, and the
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Much Ado About Nothing, in SHAKESPEARE: THE COM·
PLETE WoRKS 697, 704 (G.B Harrison ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1968). By the pricking
of my thumbs, something Shakespeare this way comes.
2. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1994).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
4. See 35 AM. JuR. 2o Federal Torts Claims Act § 2 (Supp. 1998).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. The exceptions vary widely. To cite some examples, the United
States has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims arising from postal delivery, see
§ 2680(b); tax collection, see § 2680(c); the activities of the Panama Canal Company, see
§ 2680(m); wartime combatant activities of the military, see § 26800); abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights, see § 2680(h); or with
some exceptions, for claims against law enforcement officers or arising from assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, or malicious prosecution, see § 2680(h).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Plaintiffs may sue the United States for torts caused by the
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of a federal employee acting within the scope of her
office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
7. The applicable section of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), provides:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money dam·
ages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the
claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by
the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of
this section.
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claimant then has six months to file the claim against the United
States in federal court.8 Failure to file suit within six months from
the date of mailing and within two years after the claim accrues9
"forever bar[s]" the claimant from seeking relief in the courts under
the FfCA.10 The Act does not specify to whom the agency must
send the notice of denial. The Department of Justice (DOJ),
charged by Congress with administering the Act,U therefore
promulgated 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which requires that the agency
send notice to t h e claimant, her attorney, or h e r l e g a l
representative.12
The courts have applied this regulation to claims arising under
the Act nearly uniformly, interpreting it to permit an agency to
send notice to any of the recipients enumerated in the regulation.
They generally have dismissed claimants' arguments that the notice
of denial should have been sent only to them, or alternatively, to
their attorneys, often with a succinct reference to the language of
section 14.9.13 In late 1996, however, the Ninth Circuit let slip the
dogs of war and held in Graham v. United States that section 14.9(a)
requires that the notice of denial be sent only to the claimant's at8. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or regis
tered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.

See also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
9. Despite the disjunctive in § 2401(b), which might lead the unwary to believe that a
plaintiff need satisfy only one of the two conditions specified therein, the courts have held
that a suit is time-barred unless it is filed within two years after it accrues and within six
months of final denial by the agency. See, e.g., Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823
F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987); Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1983); Schuler v.
United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1980); infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994) (directing agencies to adjust claims "in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General").
12. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) {1998) ("Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in
writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or regis
tered mail.").
13. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting under
the language of § 14.9 claimant's argument that the American Bar Association's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility Rule 4.2, which prohibits an attorney from co=unicating
directly with a represented party, mandates sending notice only to claimant's attorney);
Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the notice of denial
sent to claimant's attorney satisfied the requirements of § 14.9); Dyniewicz v. United States,
742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that sending the notice to claimant complied with
§ 14.9); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing § 14.9 to dismiss
plaintiff's argument that mailing the notice to claimant is mandatory); Robinson v. United
States, No. CIV.A.92-4869, 1993 WL 74841, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1993) (finding that
the Drug Enforcement Agency was "authorized by law," i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9, to send the
notice of final denial to the claimant and therefore did not breach its ethical duty not to
communicate directly with represented parties).
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torney, if the agency knows that the claimant is represented.14 The
court justified its override of the language of the regulation primar
ily on the grounds of "prevailing ethical standards. "15 Sending the
notice to the claimant, the Ninth Circuit held, violates the ethical
rule that attorneys may not communicate directly with parties they
know to be represented.16 Because the Bureau of Prisons sent the
notice of denial to Graham instead of to her attorney, the court
permitted Graham's suit to proceed despite its late filing.17
The Ninth Circuit's holding, while well-meaning, is perplexed in
the extreme. This Note contends that courts should follow the
traditional reading of section 14.9(a) and uphold the propriety of
notice sent to either the claimant or her attorney. Courts seeking to
grant relief to an unfortunate claimant should look to the principles
of equity, not to a tortured reading of section 14.9. Part I argues
that the traditional judicial interpretation of the Act's notice-of
denial requirement, unlike the Ninth Circuit's reading, accords with
the judicial deference properly given to administrative regulations,
the plain language of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), and the established
14. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996). Katherine Graham, a
federal prisoner, filed an administrative claim with the Department of Justice's Bureau of
Prisons. Graham listed her attorney on the claim form and her attorney confirmed his repre
sentation via mutual correspondence with the Bureau. When the Bureau eventually denied
the claim, however, it sent the notice of denial directly to Graham, who, not realizing its
importance, threw it away. The attorney, assuming that the agency had not acted on the
claim, waited the six months specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and then filed suit in district
court. In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss the suit as untimely, Graham argued
that the mailing of the notice to her did not trigger the statute of limitations because the
Bureau should have sent the notice to her attorney. The district court held that although the
Bureau had "inadvertently " mailed the notice to the claimant, the regulation authorized such
action, and dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed. See 96 F.3d at 447-48.
15. See 96 F.3d at 449.
16. See 96 F.3d at 449; MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSJONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1996). In so
holding, the court created a split among the federal courts of appeals on the specific issue of
whether sending notice directly to the claimant constitutes an ethical violation. Compare
Graham, 96 F.3d 446 with Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258 (rejecting an analysis very similar to that
of the Graham majority and upholding the mailing of notice to a represented claimant). On
the larger issue of this Note, whether an agency complies with 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 when it sends
notice to a represented claimant, the Graham court essentially overruled an earlier Ninth
Circuit opinion. Compare Graham, 96 F.3d at 449 (finding a violation of § 14.9) with
Dyniewicz, 74 2 F.2d at 485 (finding compliance with § 14.9). The Graham court acknowl·
edges only the split with Hanson.
17. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 447-48.
In the FI CA context, only one court besides Graham has allowed an untimely suit to go
forward on the ground that notice should have been sent to the attorney instead of to the
claimant See Mc Caffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 1 2 2710, at * 2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 1996). In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, however, the McCaffrey court noted that 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) does not ordinarily oblige the government to contact claimant's counsel. See
McCaffrey, 1996 WL 1 2 2710, at * 2. Instead, the court gave relief to the plaintiff by equitably
tolling the statute of limitations. See generally infra section III.C. A United States Bank
ruptcy Court, on the other hand, found the Graham reasoning attractive and held that a
bankruptcy notice sent to a represented claimant was inadequate. See In re Grand Union
Co., 204 B.R. 864, 876-77 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997).
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precepts of statutory construction. Part II demonstrates that send
ing the notice of denial directly to the claimant has the Ninth Cir
cuit's wrong rebuke and does not violate the ethical prohibition
against communication with represented parties. Finally, Part III
proposes an alternative method for ensuring that claimants are not
unfairly deprived of their rights by outrageous fortune or unscrupu
lous defendants. Courts should apply the well-established doctrine
of equitable tolling when extraordinary circumstances warrant re
lief, instead of being straight-jacketed in every case by a per se rule.
I.

HEEDING THE WORDS, WORDS, WORDS: THE JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR A LITERAL READING

The traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which permits an
agency to send notice to either the claimant, her attorney, or her
legal representative,18 enjoys strong support from a number of
sources. Section I.A demonstrates that the doctrines of judicial def
erence to agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regula
tions dictate that courts should regard as authoritative both the
DOJ's regulation and its reading of that regulation. Section I.B
then contends that the plain language of the regulation, interpreted
in accordance with the canons of construction, justifies a traditional
reading by the DOJ or other agency. Section I.B also argues that
the drafters of the regulation intended to give agencies discretion in
choosing the recipient of the denial notice, and that courts should
give effect to that intent because the usual justification for overrid
ing regulatory text - clear frustration of drafters' intent - is not
applicable here.
A.

To Thine Own Agencies Be True: The Commitment to
Judicial Deference

The principles of judicial deference to administrative agencies'
interpretations of statutes and of their own regulations demand that
courts respect the traditional interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a).
Given broad discretion by the FTCA to interpret the statute,19 the
DOJ decreed that notice may be sent either to the claimant or to
her representative. Part I.A.1 first asserts that because section
14.9(a) is a reasonable and permissible construction of the Act's
notice provisions, a court may not fashion, wrest, and bow its own
reading of the statute to require that agencies send notice only to
18. For the sake of succinctness, this Note does not make separaty arguments regarding a
claimant's legal representative. Instead, this Note can adequately address the role of a legal
representative with its arguments regarding attorneys. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448 (calling
Graham's attorney her "legal representative").
19. See 28 U. S.C. § 267 2 (1994) (providing that agencies adjust claims "in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General").
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attorneys. Part I.A.2 then argues that because the judiciary also
owes deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations,
a court should ratify the DOJ's construction of section 14.9(a),
which permits notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney.
This Part concludes that these doctrines of judicial deference re
quire that courts direct policy concerns to the political branches of
the government. Because neither the DOJ nor Congress has found
section 14.9(a) and its traditional interpretation to be so rank and
gross in nature as to require changing, courts should accede to the
language of the regulation and its implementation by agencies and
allow agencies to send notice to the claimant.
1.

Chevron Deference

Under the principles of judicial deference to agencies' interpre
tations of statutes, a court should defer to the regulation promul
gated by the DOJ, which allows agencies to choose the recipient of
the notice of denial. The Supreme Court has held, most notably in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,20 that
when a court reviews an administrative agency's interpretation of a
statutory provision the agency is charged with administering, the
court must accept the agency's "reasonable" or "permissible" con
struction, if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue in ques
tion.21 The interpretation offered by the agency, moreover, need
not be the only permissible interpretation or even one the court
itself would have reached.22 "If the agency regulation is not in con
flict with the plain language of the statute," the Supreme Court
makes clear, "a reviewing court must give deference to the agency's
20. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Earlier Supreme Court cases also expounded the principles of
deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965).
21. See Chevron, 461 U.S. at 842-44; see also KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291-92 (1988). The Court in Chevron made clear that if Congress "explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation." 467 U.S. at 843-44. If, on the other hand, Congress
directly addressed the issue and its intent is clear, the court must reject any construction that
is contrary to the clear congressional intent. See 467 U.S. at 842-43, 843 n.9.
Later cases discussed what sort of ambiguity courts require in the statute in order to
proceed to the determination of whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or permis
sible and therefore entitled to deference. A minority of courts maintain that any ambiguity
whatsoever is enough for a court to proceed to the reasonableness/permissibility determina
tion. See, e.g., Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding ambi
guity in a statutory caption sufficient). The majority view, however, requires that the
ambiguity be substantial. A court must first apply the traditional tools of statutory construc
tion; only if the court cannot thereby discern congressional intent does it analyze the agency's
interpretation. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
22. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843 n.11; Reed v. Reno, 146 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1998).
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interpretation of the statute."23 In short, the judiciary may not sup
plant an agency's judgment with its own.24
In enacting and amending the Federal Tort Claims Act, Con
gress essentially delegated the choice to the DOJ by remaining si
lent on the issue of the proper recipient of the denial notice.25 The
Attorney General, in promulgating 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), construed
the FTCA's notice requirement to allow notice to be sent to either
the claimant or her attorney. To merit the great deference ac
corded administrative regulations, section 14.9(a) need only be rea
sonable, a measure the regulation easily meets. Though 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) mentions neither the claimant nor the claimant's attor
ney, section 2675 speaks in terms of the claimant. A suit is barred,
that section provides, unless "the claimant shall have first presented
the claim to the appropriate Federal agency."26 When the only
party named in the FTCA notice provisions is the claimant, al
lowing the notice of denial to be sent to the claimant is not "arbi
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary"27 to the statute.28
Because section 14.9(a) is a reasonable interpretation of the
Act's notice provisions, that regulation should be the be-all and
end-all of a court's analysis of permissible notice recipients. A
court cannot issue a blanket order that notice be sent only to coun
sel of record.29 Such a rule, in addition to playing fast and loose
with the plain language of the regulation, would not give proper
deference to the DOJ's interpretation. A court should not disturb a
reasonable choice made by an agency unless the statute or its legis
lative history shows that Congress would not have approved of the
23. KMart Corp., 486 U.S. at 292; see also Chevron, 461 U.S. at 844 (holding that courts
must uphold administrative regulations unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute").
24. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); Associated FISheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997).
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1994); Chevron, 461 U.S. at 843-44. The legislative
history is similarly silent. See S. REP. No. 89-1327 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2515; H.R. REP. No. 89-1532 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515 .
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added).
27. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
28. One might argue, of course, that the drafters of § 2675 merely used the term "claim
ant" as shorthand for "claimant, or, if the claimant is represented, her attorney." Under
Chevron, however, a proponent of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) need only demonstrate that interpret
ing the statutory "claimant" to refer to the actual claimant is not manifestly contrary to the
statute. Chevron does not allow a reviewing court to decide that the drafters actually meant
something different, unless the drafters' intent is unmistakable. See Young v. Co=unity
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Reed v. Reno, 146 F.3d
392, 395 (6th Cir. 1998).
29. Cf. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) ("[T)he fact that Congress might
have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft
statutes . . . . 'There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and
rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.'" (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))).
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agency's interpretation.30 Nothing in the Act, its amendments, or
its legislative history demonstrates congressional rejection of the
DOJ's interpretation of the notice requirement. Because the Ninth
Circuit "may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro
vision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency,"31 the Graham court should have confirmed the lan
guage of section 14.9.
2.

Bowles Deference

The Ninth Circuit is further curtailed to the fair proportion of
the traditional reading by a second prescript of judicial deference.
In addition to giving deference to the regulation promulgated by
the DOJ, a court should also give deference to the DOJ's interpre
tation of its own regulation and allow the DOJ and its constituent
subdivisions to choose from among the recipients the Attorney
General listed in section 14.9(a). The Supreme Court held in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Company32 and subsequent
cases33 that when the meaning of an administrative construction it
self is in doubt, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is
controlling unless that interpretation is "plainly erroneous or incon
sistent with the regulation. "34 As with Chevron deference, an
agency's approach need not be the only one it could have permissi
bly adopted, nor even one the court itself would have chosen.35
The Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau), a subordinate arm of the
Justice Department,36 has interpreted section 14.9(a) in conformity
30. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
31. 467 U.S. at 844.
32. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
33. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Martin v. Occu
pational Safety and Health Review Commn., 499 U.S. 144 (1991); Robertson v. Methow Val·
ley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-59 (1989); see also, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53
F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kester v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1981).
34. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414. This kind of deference, the Court noted, is "even more
clearly in order" than deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See Udall v. Tallman
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); see also Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 1997); Southern
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 909 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court ex
plained that while congressional intent or constitutional principles may sometimes be rele
vant in choosing a construction, the "ultimate criterion" is the administrative interpretation.
See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414.
35. A court need only find that the agency's construction is sufficiently reasonable and
consistent with the wording of the regulation and the statute under which the regulation was
promulgated. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991); Young v. Com
munity Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); see also General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327
(noting that courts may defer even "where the agency's reading of the statute would not be
obvious to the most astute reader" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. The Department of Justice consists of four principal organizational units: offices, di
visions, bureaus, and boards. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (1998). The Bureau of Prisons, like the
other DOJ subdivisions, remains under the control of the DOJ. For example, the Attorney
General resolves any jurisdictional disagreements between the Bureau and the other subdivi
sions. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.195 (1998). The Attorney General also controls both the Director of
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with that regulation's plain language: the Bureau sends notice
either to claimants or to attomeys.37 While the Bureau may have a
"practice" of sending notice to counsel,38 doing so is not an obliga
tion. Because the DOJ's interpretation of section 14.9(a) via the
Bureau39 is consistent with the regulation, a court complying with
the Bowles doctrine should defer to the DOJ's construction and al
low notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney.40
Obliged to acknowledge the pertinence of at least the Chevron
doctrine,41 the Graham court charges once more unto the breach
and declares that the Bureau did not follow its own interpretation
of the regulation in question. The Ninth Circuit claims that the Buthe Bureau and the discharge of the Bureau's duties. See 18 U.S.C.§§ 4041, 4042 (1994); 28
C.F.R.§ 0.96, 0.96(d) (1998). The Director of the Bureau may redelegate the authority given
to him by the Attorney General only to employees of the Department of Justice. See 28
C.F.R.§ 0.97 (1998).
Given the dominion of the DOJ over the Bureau of Prison's affairs, the Graham majority
is correct to consider the Bureau of Prisons and the DOJ to be the same agency. See Graham
v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) (calling the DOJ "the defendant in this
action"); see also Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1974) ("[T)he Bureau of
Prisons . . . functions as a part of the Department of Justice . . . ." ); cf. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 117 S. Ct 796, 807 (1997) (holding that
when Congress has divided the adjudicative and enforcement/litigation duties of a single
agency into "two sub-'agencies,' . . . it is the overarching agency that is the 'agency"' for
purposes of naming a respondent).
37. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to what the opinion
claims, the agency has never interpreted the regulation as requiring that notice be sent to
counsel if the claimant is represented."). Compare Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244,
245 (9th Cir. 1985) (reporting that the Bureau of Prisons sent notice of denial to claimant's
attorney) with Graham, 96 F.3d at 447 (reporting that the Bureau of Prisons sent notice of
denial to claimant) and Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (same). Other agencies have proved likewise variable in their "practice" under the
FTCA. Compare, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 1984) (reporting
that the Veterans Administration (VA) sent notice to claimant) with Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860
F.2d 338, 339 (9th Cir. 1988) (reporting that the VA sent notice to claimant's eounsel).
38. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
39. See supra note 36. Even if a court considered the Bureau to be a separate agency
from the DOJ, however, the traditional construction of§ 14.9(a) would still prevail. If the
Bureau of Prisons were a different agency than the DOJ, the Bureau's interpretation of the
FTCA's notice provisions or of § 14.9(a) would not merit deference; under Chevron, the
proper inquiry would be solely regarding the DOJ's interpretation. See American Rivers,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997); California Natl.
Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 697 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1983). And under Chev
ron, the result is clear: courts (and other administrative agencies) must accede to the DOJ's
interpretation of the statutory notice provisions, i.e.,§ 14.9(a), which allows notice to be sent
to a represented claimant. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
40. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). In fact, a court
might have rendered the Bureau infirm of purpose if the agency had interpreted§ 14.9(a) as
the Ninth Circuit has. Construing§ 14.9(a) to direct notice to be sent only to known counsel
is inconsistent with that regulation, given § 14.9(a)'s "or" language. See infra section I.B
(discussing the regulation's plain language and arguing that courts must give effect to that
language). Courts will invalidate an agency interpretation inconsistent with the wording of
the regulation. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-73 (1977).
41. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449.
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reau's correspondence with Graham's counsel42 showed that the
Bureau intended to deal solely with the attorney, and that the Bu
reau therefore follows the Graham majority's interpretation of sec
tion 14.9(a).43 This mumpsimus ascends the highest heaven of
invention, but does not hold up under the applicable case law or the
facts. By sending notice alternatively to claimants and to counsel,44
the Bureau has demonstrated that the DOJ interprets section
14.9(a) to allow for a choice of notice recipients. Under Bowles, a
court should defer to that interpretation.45 The "or" in section
14.9(a) and the Bureau's application of that disjunctive denote a
foregone conclusion: the Ninth Circuit should have adhered to the
principles of judicial deference and upheld the sending of the notice
to Graham.
The FTCA gives the DOJ license to issue regulations interpret
ing the Act. Policy arguments regarding those regulations "should
be addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges."46 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and the DOJ's interpretation of it are reason
able47-and thereby hangs a tale. Had the DOJ or Congress agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's perception of the impropriety of sending
notice directly to a represented claimant, either one could have
changed the policy at some time during the twenty years since the
regulation was enacted.48 Instead, they acquiesced in the findings
of the courts that heeded the regulation's "or."49 Under the princi
ples of judicial deference articulated by the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit itself, absent exceptional circumstances50 courts
should approve the discretion the statute and regulation give to ad
ministrative agencies.

42. See supra note 14.
43. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449-50. Giving deference to the Bureau's blunder of sending
the notice to the claimant, the majority declares, would be improperly applying the Chevron
doctrine to the "rubber-stamping (of] an after-the-fact rationalization of a mistake." 96 F.3d
at 450.
44. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
46. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984);

see also Stedman v. Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989).
47. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
48. See Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 528
F.2d 645, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1976) ("If the regulation missed its mark, the fault lies in the word
ing of the regulation - a matter easily remedied under the flexible regulation promulgating
structure . . ..").
49. See supra note 13.
50. See infra Part III.
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Speaking Plain and to the Purpose: Language, Construction,
and the Department of Justice's Intent

A court may find the traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 un
reasonable under Bowles only if it clearly thwarts the plain lan
guage of the regulation or the intent of the regulation's drafter, the
DOJ.51 Yet the unambiguous language of the regulation52 requires
that courts approve whatever recipient the agency chooses, be it the
claimant or her attorney. This section argues that the traditional
reading of section 14.9(a), which allows notice of denial to be sent
to either the claimant or her attorney, frustrates neither the regula
tion's plain meaning nor the purposes of the regulation and the stat
utory notice provisions it effects. This section makes clear,
furthermore, that the evidence of the DOJ's intent in drafting sec
tion 14.9(a) supports the traditional interpretation of the regulation.
The text of a regulation or statute is the accepted starting point
for interpretation.53 With exquisite reason, courts have agreed that
the purpose and meaning of statutes and regulations are best indi
cated by the "ordinary meaning" of the words used.54 The judici
ary, furthermore, is loath to assume that the drafters' work product
is merely full of sound and fury, signifying nothing: the courts have
a duty to give effect, if possible, to every word and phrase used in a
regulation.55 In short, the plain meaning controls.56
The text of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is clear.57 The regulation pro
vides: "Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing
and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by
certified or registered mail."58 In common usage, the word "or"
51. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
52. The regulation provides: "Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing
and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail."
28 C.F.R.§ 14.9(a) (1998).
53. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); Pennsylvania Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887
F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1989). Courts apply the same principles of construction to regula
tions as they do to statutes. See, e.g., Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222 n.20
(1981); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935).
54. See Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108. See also, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 57 n.9 (1996); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 (1992); United States
v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985); United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824,
825-26 (9th Cir. 1989).
55. See United States Dept. of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 504 n.6 (1993); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992).
56. See United States Natl. Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508
U.S. 439, 453-54 (1993); Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); Strick
land v. Commissioner, Me. Dept. of Human Serv., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995).
57. A disagreement between courts as to the interpretation of a statute or regulation does
not make the statute or regulation ambiguous for purposes of plain-language analysis. See
Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d 634, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. 28 C.F.R.§ 14.9(a) (emphasis added).
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indicates a choice among all of the concepts which surround it.59
Rather than following the Ninth Circuit's attempt to fright the
words out of their right sense and ignore part of the text, courts
should presume the usual disjunctive usage of "or" and allow an
agency sending a notice of denial to choose between the claimant
and her attorney.60
Giving effect to section 14.9(a)'s text does not obstruct the
DOJ's intent in promulgating the regulation or the aim of the
FTCA's notice provisions. A court may ignore the plain language
of a regulation only when straightforward application of the text
would lead to absurd results, ones that clearly frustrate the drafters'
intent. 61 In Willis v. United States, 62 for example, the Second Cir
cuit held that Congress intended the "or" in section 2401(b) of the
FTCA63 to mean "and. "64 Otherwise, a claimant who filed a claim
with the administrative agency within two years of the claim's ac
crual could thereafter bring a claim in a district court at any time in
the future, no matter how heavy the interim.65 The specter of such
an absurd result,66 the court found, justified the performance of
"surgery upon [the] statutory text[] ... thereby giving effect to
what Congress meant as distinguished from what it said."67 Other
59. See WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1585 (1986) ("conj. 1
used as a function word to indicate (1) an alternative between different or unlike things,
states, or actions; ( 2) choice between alternative things, states or courses."); THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 873 ( 2d college ed. 1985) ("a. An alternative, usually only before
the last term of a series."); BoB DOROUGH, Conjunction Junction, on SCHOOLHOUSE RocK:
GRAMMAR RocK (American Broadcasting Music, Inc. 1973).

-

60. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J., dissent
ing); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
61. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 27 2, 284 (1987); Commis
sioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. United States, 618 F.2d
736, 739 ( Ct. Cl. 1980); Chicago Transit Auth. v. Adams, 607 F.2d 1 284, 1 289-90 (7th Cir.
1979). Alternatively, in exceptional cases where straightforward application of regulatory
text leads to a particularly unfair expiration of the limitations period, courts may utilize the
doctrine of equitable tolling. See infra Part III.
6 2. 719 F.2d 608 ( 2d Cir. 1983).
63. See supra note 8.
64. Other courts holding§ 2401(b)'s "or " to mean "and " include the 5th Circuit in Hous
ton v. United States Postal Serv., 8 23 F.2d 896, 90 2 (5th Cir. 1987), and the D.C. Circuit in
Schuler v. United States, 6 28 F.2d 199, 201 ( D.C. Cir. 1980).

65. See Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 610 ( 2d Cir. 1983).
66. Such a result would deprive a potential defendant of the repose that statutes of limita
tions are meant to provide. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); English v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 8 28 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). The evidence in a case, furthermore,
would be left but a very prey to time: the eventual factfinder would have to piece out the
imperfections of unavailable or forgetful witnesses and lost evidence. See Kubrick, 444 U.S.
at 1�7; Mortensen v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 23, 27 ( S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67. Willis, 719 F.2d at 610. The court points to the legislative history of§ 2401 to illumi
nate Congress's intent that the "or" mean "and." In the Senate report, for example, the
congressional committee stated that "a claimant must file a claim in writing ... within 2 years
after the claim accrues, and [is] further require[d to file] a court action within 6 months of
notice by certified or registered mail of a final decision . . . . " S. REP. No. 89-13 27, Analysis
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courts, similarly wishing to avoid results thatiplainly contradict leg
islative purpose, have also refused to be bound by the whips and
scorns of a strict grammatical construction.68
In contrast to these cases, however, the traditional reading of 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is consistent with the intent of the regulation's
drafter. The purpose of section 14.9(a) is to explicate the FTCA's
notice provisions,69 which say only that an agency must send the
notice of denial by certified or registered mail.70 Section 14.9(a)
clarifies these provisions by specifying to whom the notice may be
sent, and the traditional interpretation of the regulation simply con
forms to the words of the regulation. Any fears that the traditional
interpretation of section 14.9(a) produces "absurd or futile"71 re
sults, therefore, are shallow, without instance.72
The Ninth Circuit, however, focuses not on the purpose of the
regulation but rather on the purpose of the statutory notice provi
sions. Reasoning that the object of the notice provisions is to "en
sure that notice is given in a manner that effectively triggers the
time for filing a court action,"73 the court claims that allowing an
agency to send notice directly to a represented claimant thwarts
that purpose.74 The court focuses on an attorney's responsibility for
preparing and filing the suit,75 implying that the running of the limi§ 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2522; see also Willis, 719 F.2d at 612. The
Senate report adds that the proposed amendments to the FICA "will have the effect of
reducing the number of pending claims which may become stale and long delayed because of
the extended time required for their consideration,.'' S. REP. No. 89-1327, Statement. After
judicial recognition of such clearly expressed intent, Congress likely felt it unnecessary to
change the wording of the Act's notice provisions. The history of§ 14.9(a), on the other
hand, evidences no such clear intent contrary to the regulation's plain meaning. Though
§ 14.9(a) is a regulation, unlike § 2401, the same principles of construction apply to both
regulations and statutes. See supra note 53.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In implementing the
statute, the Department of Justice has attempted to prescribe the notice requirement more
fully . . • .").
70. See 28 U.S.C.§§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1994).
71. J.C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1962).
72. As Part II demonstrates, sending notice to a represented claimant pursuant to§ 14.9
does not violate the ethical rule against communicating with represented parties, because the
ethical rule itself contains an exception for commurucations authorized by law. Allowing a
court to overturn as "absurd" (i.e., as an ethical violation) this or any other law authorizing
contact with a represented claimant would render that exception meaningless. See infra Part
I
rr
73. Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. In support of its claim, the majority adduces the Senate and
House reports on the 1966 amendments to the FICA. See 96 F.3d at 448. Neither report,
however, discusses the notice provisions. The Senate report, for example, merely reiterates
that the claimant must file suit within six months of notice by certified or registered mail of
the agency's final decision. See S. REP. No. 89-1327, Analysis § 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2522.
74. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448.
75. See 96 F.3d at 448.
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tations period should depend upon the agency's mailing the denial
notice to the person who will pursue the claim. But this supposition
greets the statute with sharp defiance: section 2401(b) specifically
states that the statute of limitations is triggered on the date the no
tice is mailed.76 Neither notice provision deems relevant the date of
receipt or the recipient's role in proceeding with the claim; they
simply dictate that the claimant has six months from the date of
mailing to file suit. Neither receipt by nor actual notice to the
claimant is required.77 An agency effectively commences the six
month limitations period by sending the notice directly to a repre
sented claimant.
Even assuming arguendo that satisfactory triggering of the stat
ute of limitations requires receipt and comprehension by the person
who will prepare the claim, the Ninth Circuit's per se rule would
not advance that end enough to justify its bloody constraint on the
plain language of section 14.9(a). The Graham majority's interpre
tation benefits only those claimants with attorneys; its translation of
section 14.9(a) cannot make an unrepresented claimant more noble
in reason and better able to understand the notice she receives.
The Ninth Circuit's reading, furthermore, will matter only in those
cases where a represented claimant fails to timely forward the no
tice to her attorney. Only then would the traditional reading puzzle
the putative will of the FTCA's notice provisions; this hardly consti
tutes the "plain variance" or "absurd result" necessary to ignore the
text of the regulation.78 And for myriad reasons, an attorney could
untimely file a claimant's suit even if the agency sends the notice of
denial directly to the attorney.79 The Graham attorney-only pre76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994) ("unless action is begun within six months after the
date of mailing"). Other statutes, in contrast, provide that receipt of the notice triggers the
statute of limitations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994) (providing that a complaint
against the government for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act must be filed
within 90 days of the claimant's receipt of notice of final action taken by the EEOC).
77. See Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988); Carr v. Veterans Admin.,
522 F.2d 1355, 1357 (5th Cir. 1975); Pascarella v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 790, 792 (D.
Conn. 1984).
The two-year statute of limitations in§ 2401(b) is equally strict. A claim accrues once a
plaintiff discovers the existence and cause of her injury, for example, even if she is unaware
that her injury was negligently inflicted or that she has legal rights. See United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123 {1979); Golden v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. C 95-3417, 1995 WL
705134, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995).
78. In those cases where the attorney did not receive notice because the administrative
agency did not act fairly (where the agency deliberately declined to send the notice to an
attorney with whom it had been previously communicating, for example), a court could equi·
tably toll the statute of limitations. See infra Part III.
79. In Pascarella v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 790 (D. Conn. 1984), for example, the
General Services Administration sent its final denial of the plaintiff's claim to her attorney at
his firm. No one at the firm ever brought the notice to the attention of the plaintiff's counsel,
so both he and the plaintiff remained unaware of the denial until after the statute of limita·
tions had run. The court, unsympathetic to their plight, issued summary judgment for the
defendant. See 582 F. Supp. at 792. Potential mishaps need not be as complicated as that.
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cept is a tool too rudely stamped to achieve the statute's supposed
aim.
An examination of other regulations drafted by the subdivisions
of the DOJ, furthermore, demonstrates the DOJ's purposefulness
in designating both a represented claimant and her attorney as au
thorized recipients. In other regulations but not in section 14.9(a),
the Attorney General allowed limitations on the parties to whom
agencies may send notice. By doing so, the DOJ evinced its most
profound earnest that agencies be free to choose the recipient of
the notice of denial. The regulations of the DOJ's Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS),80 for example, direct that the INS
send notice only to the attorney or representative of record if the
person is represented.81 By passing on this attorney-only notice
provision in the INS regulations, the DOJ has exhibited its ability to
limit the entities to whom notice may be sent.82 That the Attorney
General chose to employ the differing language of section 14.9(a)
with respect to FTCA claims confirms its intent to allow notice
under the FI'CA to be sent also to a represented claimant.83 If it

Anattorney could simply misplace the notice of denial, for instance, or miscalculate the date
on which the limitations period expires.
80. The INS, like the other DOJ subdivisions, i:emains under the control of the DOJ. The
Attorney General bears the ultimate responsibility of administering and enforcing the immi
gration laws, controls all employees and records of the INS, and is charged with promulgating
the immigration regulations. See8 U.S.C. § l103(a) (1994). The Attorney General may dele
gate hisresponsibilities and authorityto the Commissioner of the INS, see8 U.S.C. §1103(b),
but doing so does not divest the Attorney General of any of his powers, privileges, or duties.
See8 C.F.R. §2.1 (1994).
81. 8 C.F.R. §292.S(a) (1994) provides: "Whenever a person is required by any of the
provisions of thischapter to give or be given notice[,] . . . such notice .. . shall be given by or
to ... the attorney or representative of record, or the person himself ifunrepresented."
82. Thisdifferentiation regarding notice also appears in other contexts. The bankruptcy
rules, for example, contain several contrasting rules of service. Rule 3007 states that an ob
jection to a claim must be delivered to the claimant;Rule 7004(h) requires that service on
insured depository institutions be made to their counsel;and Rule 7004(b)(9) requires that a
debtor and its attorney be served simultaneously ifthe debtor is represented. See In re Lo
mas Fmancial Corp., 212 B.R. 46, 52-53 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997). Section 405 of the Social
Security Act (SSA), which deals with the procedure for payment of social security benefits,
provides that notice of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security willbe mailed
to the individual. See42 U.S.C. §405;20 C.F.R. §422.210(c) (1994). Ifan individual for
mally appoints a representative, however, the Social SecurityAdministration willsend the
notice to the representative. See20 C.F.R. §404.1707;20 C.F.R. §404.1715 (1994). In either
case, the Fifth Circuit has held that the statute of limitations on judicial review under the SSA
begins running when the individualreceives notice,not when the attorney receives it. See
Flores v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1991).
83. Cf. BFPv. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) ("[I]t is generally pre
sumed that [a drafter] acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another."); Tafoya v. United States Dept. of Justice,
Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 748 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1984) ("We presume
that . . . clear use of different terminology within a body of legislation is evidence of an
intentional differentiation.").
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had had no such intent, the DOJ would have used language like
that of the INS regulation.84
The DOJ intended, as clear as is the summer sun, to authorize
agencies to send notice to the claimant or her attorney. Except in
extraordinary conditions that justify an exception to the traditional
reading,85 courts should yield to that intent.
II.

MucH Ano ABouT NoTHING: THE ETHICS OF SENDING
NOTI CE TO A REPRESENTED CLAIMANT

The traditional construction of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) does not vio
late the ethical rule against attorneys communicating with parties
they know to be represented by legal counsel. 86 Because the rule
itself allows for direct contact with represented parties where au
thorized by law, sending the notice of denial to a represented claim
ant does not contravene the rule.
The Graham majority issues its per se rule largely in response to
the ethical violation it misreads into an agency's communicating di
rectly with a represented claimant. The court, in refusing to dismiss
Graham's suit as untimely,87 calls upon the long-standing ethical
rule that prohibits attorneys from communicating with persons they
know to be represented about the subject matter of the representa
tion. This rule, the Ninth Circuit explains, is designed to prevent a
lawyer from improperly taking advantage of a lay person's lack of
84. The language of the INS regulation also counters any claim that the DOJ included the
words "the claimant " in 28 C.F.R.§ 14.9(a) only to account for claimants not represented by
an attorney. The INS Commissioner, and therefore the DOJ, see supra note 80, encompasses
unrepresented claimants much more definitely in the INS regulation by providing that notice
be sent to "the person himself if unrepresented. " 8 C.F.R.§ 29 2.5. Had the DOJ intended
for notice to be sent only to a represented claimant's attorney, furthermore, it could have
accomplished that result without naming "the claimant " at all. A regulation naming the
claimant's attorney as the only proper recipient of the _denial notice would allow for the
notice to be sent to the claimant if she had no attorney.

85. See infra PartIII.
86. The general embodiment of this proscription is Rule 4. 2 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre
sentation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to
do so.
MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 2 (1995). The Model Rules of Profes
sional Conduct were adopted in 1983, replacing the ABA Model Code of Professional Re
sponsibility, which itself superseded the 1908 Canons ofProfessional Ethics. DR 7-104(A)(1)
of the Model Code was substantially identical to the original Model Rule 4. 2. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995); ANNOTATED
MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 2, Model Code Comparison (1983).
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have rules to protect represented persons from
contact by opposing counsel. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996).
See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 (1995)
(examining the history of the prohibition, beginning with Hoffman's 1836 treatise).
87. For the facts of the case, see supra note 14.
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legal knowledge and training.ss So while the majority's rewriting of
the regulation is madness, there is commendable method in it; the
court wishes to prevent agencies from causing claimants like
Graham to lose their claims through their own incompetence.s9
The majority accordingly concludes that the direct contact with a
represented claimant permitted by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) violates the
anti-contact ethical norm.9o
The milk of human kindness, however, cannot overcome the ex
press license granted by the ethical rule itself for an administrative
agency to send the notice of denial to a claimant. The rule specifi
cally allows communication with a represented party if such contact
is "authorized by law."91 Communications authorized by law, the
drafters of the model rule elucidated, include those that are "specif
ically authorized by statute, court rule, court order, statutorily au
thorized regulation or judicial decisional precedent."92 Even the
Ninth Circuit admits that "express legal authorization overrides
ethical rules."93 Because the FTCA directs the Attorney General
to promulgate regulations to implement the Act,94 sending notice to
a represented claimant under the auspices of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9( a) fits
into the "authorized by law" exception to Model Rule 4.2, its pred
ecessors, and its state-law progeny.95
A proponent of the Ninth Circuit's standpoint might attempt to
fright the soul of this fearful adversary by arguing that the general
authority the FTCA gives to the DOJ to promulgate regulations
does not specifically authorize the DOJ to issue regulations that
contravene ethical rules, and that such regulations are therefore
"not authorized by law." Even assuming arguendo that section
14.9(a) does violate the anti-contact rule, however, the DOJ did not
88. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449; see also Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1121 {8th
Cir. 1997); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995);
ANNOTATED MODEL RuLES, supra note 86, Legal Background.
89. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448.
90. See 96 F.3d at 449.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDU CT Rule 4.2 (1995). Every jurisdiction but
Florida expressly makes this exception to its anti-contact rule. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995). But see also Florida Bar Assn.
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 89-6 {1990) (maintaining that even Florida's rule "must
be construed to allow compliance with statutes requiring notice or service of process directly
on the adverse party"). For the sake of clarity, this Note will use the language of Model Rule
4.2 and the ABA opinions regarding Rule 4.2.
92. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995) (emphasis added).
93. Graham, 96 F.3d at 449.
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994).
95. If issued pursuant to statutory authority, substantive agency regulations implementing
federal statutes have the "force and effect of law." See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 295-96 (1979 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Public Utilities Commn. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 (1958).
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need specific congressional authorization to promulgate such a reg
ulation. The Supreme Court has held that state law is nullified to
the extent that it conflicts with a federal regulation.96 The Court
added that "[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover,
whether the administrator failed to exercise an option to promul
gate regulations which did not disturb state law is not dispositive."97
The general grant of authority the Act gives to the DOJ, therefore,
is sufficient to support the DOJ's issuance of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a),
regardless of whether that regulation contradicts the no-contact
rule.9s An agency sending notice to a represented claimant in ac
cordance with section 14.9(a) confines itself within the modest lim
its of ethics, because doing so is authorized by law.
Refusing to be cornered by the authorized-by-law exception,
however, the Graham majority screws its courage to the sticking
place and asserts that the real issue is whether 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a)
should even be interpreted to authorize agency contact with a rep
resented claimant. The court notes that the defendant "govern
ment offers no guidance as to why such a blanket authorization is
necessary, or even useful, in this context"99 and chides the Eighth
Circuit for not explaining why the regulation should be read to au
thorize such contact when it upheld the mailing of notice to a repre
sented claimant in Hanson v. United States.100 The regulation
96. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Flor
ida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
97. Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 154; see also Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 308; United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961).
98. Nevertheless, the judiciary has expressed some concern over an agency being allowed
to misuse the "authorized by law" exception to exempt its attorneys from adherence to the
rules of ethics. The single regulation called into question on these grounds is 28 C.F.R. § 77,
in which the DOJ authorizes government attorneys to communicate directly with a number
of represented parties, including represented defendants being investigated for "additional,
different, or ongoing crimes or civil violations" and employees of a represented organization
who are not "controlling individual[s]." See 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.6(e), 77.lO(c) (1994). At least
one court has held that this regulation is "not authorized by law," on the grounds that general
statutes do not give sufficient authority for the DOJ to excuse its attorneys from state ethical
requirements. See United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp.
1288, 1294 (E.D. Mo. 1997); cf. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (reaching
the same holding regarding the "Thornburgh Memorandum," a DOJ policy statement that
was the precursor to 28 C.F.R. § 77). O'Keefe, however, overlooks the Supreme Court prece
dent holding that a regulation prevails over conflicting state law. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed., 458
U.S. at 153-54; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43. In addition, the
administrative role of an attorney merely sending notice of denial to a claimant does not raise
the same ethical dilemmas as an attorney performing the investigative and adversarial func
tions contemplated in § 77.
99. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 441, 449 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. See 96 F.3d at 449; Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1990). Hanson is
the only other appellate decision to date on the ethical violation issue. In Hanson, the Bu
reau of Prisons sent its notice of denial by certified letter to the claimant, who subsequently
did not file his medical malpractice suit against the government until nearly three months
after the limitations period had expired. In his appeal from the dismissal of his claim, the
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should therefore be interpreted, the court concludes, not as "an ex
ception to prevailing ethical norms . . . [but rather] in accordance
with those norms. "101
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that
in all American jurisdictions but one,102 the exception is the norm.
Because section 14.9(a) gives express permission to contact a repre
sented party, the lawyer who does so is almost universally in com
pliance with the ethical rule. Neither the government nor the
judiciary need Gudgel their brains to justify the necessity or useful
ness of authorizing the exception to the ethical rule. The DOJ had
the authority to draft this regulation, and the regulation says an
agency may send notice to the claimant. The Ninth Circuit should
respect that administrative decision, rather than calling for the DOJ
or another court to justify the regulation.103
An agency deciding where to send notice, therefore, need not
think too precisely on the event. Regardless of whether the sending
of the notice of denial to a represented claimant is intentional104 or
erroneous, the agency that does so violates no ethical rule against
co:t;nmunicating with represented parties.10s
claimant argued that sending the notice to him instead of to his attorney of record violated
DR 7-104(a)(l) of the ABA's Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility, and therefore ren
dered the notice ineffective. Tue Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that since 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) authorized the Bureau to send the notice to the claimant, no ethical violation
occurred. See Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258.
Tue Graham dissent hurls down its indignation at the majority's censure of its fellow
appellate court: "No doubt the Eighth Circuit didn't offer such an explanation," the dissent
retorts, "because it saw no plausible way to wring the majority's meaning from the regula
tion's sparse language." Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
101. Graham, 96 F.3d at 449.
102. See supra note 91.
103. Concluding that 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is not authorized by law, furthermore, would
have dire effects on the administrative state. As the dissent points out, scores of federal
regulations "authorize - perhaps even require - that notice be sent to the claimant person
ally[,]" to the claimant and her attorney, or in language substantially identical to that of 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a), to the claimant or her attorney. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 452 nn.3, 5
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (listing 31 regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant, 7
regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant and her attorney, and 22 regulations
requiring notice to be sent to the claimant or her attorney). Tue Graham per se rule would
invalidate all of the regulations in the second and third groups, and possibly those in the first
as well, a result that Congress could not have intended.
104. If the claimant can demonstrate that the agency deliberately sent the notice to her
instead of to her known counsel with the intent of causing her to miss the six-month deadline,
a court could exercise its equitable discretion, toll the statute of limitations, and allow her suit
to proceed. See infra Part III.
105. See Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258; Robinson v. United States, Nos. CIV. 92-4869, CIV. 926175, 1993 WL 74841, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1993) ("[T]he DEA was 'authorized by
law' [i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9] to send the final denial to the claimant."); cf. Weinstein v. Rosen
bloom, 322 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (Ill. 1974) (holding that notice requesting a continuance sent by
an attorney directly to the adverse party, in accordance with the applicable regulation of the
Illinois Industrial Commission, was "pursuant to law" and therefore did not violate Canon 7,
EC 7-18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
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III.

THE BEITER PART OF VALOR IS DISCR E TI
EQUITABLE TOLLING ALTERNATIVE

[V
o l . 97 :103 4
ON:

THE

Even though sending notice to a represented claimant is author
ized by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and therefore does not in and of itself
violate ethical norms, occasionally a court should refuse to counte
nance such an action and allow a suit otherwise precluded by the
statute of limitations to proceed. This Part describes some of those
situations and contends that even in those cases, the Graham ma
jority's per se rule prohibiting agencies from sending notice to rep
resented claimants is not necessary to do good service to claimants.
The per se rule, moreover, is overbroad: any represented claimant
who received notice would benefit from the rule, regardless of the
circumstances surrounding the running of the statute of limitations
in that case.
Instead, in extreme cases courts should apply the well
established principles of equitable tolling to permit suit when dis
missal would be unjust. The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a
court to suspend the statute of limitations temporarily on grounds
of fairness to the plaintiff, usually having to do with some secret
mischief the defendant sets abroach.1 06 Application of this doctrine
strikes the proper balance between serving the interests of justice
and heeding the will of Congress in enacting the FTCA's statute of
limitations. Courts may refuse to ratify an agency's sending of no
tice to a represented claimant, but if it were done, when 'tis done,
then 'twere well it were done equitably.
Section III.A first describes the judicial acceptance of equitable
tolling in the FTCA context. Acknowledging the need for some
flexibility in applying statutes of limitations to bar actions under the
Act, section ill. A maintains that the doctrine of equitable tolling
serves that need with more matter and less art than the Ninth Cir
cuit's per se rule. Section III.B then presents the rules for equitable
tolling under the Act, which rein in trial judges' discretion and en106. See infrasection III.B. Many cou rts distinguish between two kinds of equitable ex 
ceptions to the limitations period : equitable tolling and equitable estoppel . When a plaintiff
si unaware of her cause of action ,these courts say ,equitable tolling is the proper course . A
cou rt may toll the limitations pe riod , for example , when "the defendant has wrongfully
decei v
ed or misled the plainti ff n
i order to conceal the existence of a cause of action ." Eng 
lish v. Pabst Brewing Co. ,828 F.2d 10 47 , 10 49 ( 4th Cir . 1987) ; see also Kelley v. NLRB ,79
F.3d 1238 , 12 47- 48 ( 1st Cir. 1996) ; Goodhand v. United States , 40 F.3d 209 , 2 13 (7th Cir .
199 4). Equitable estoppel , on the other hand, applies when the plainti ffknows about the
cause of action. Acou rt willtoll the statute of limitations on the basis of equitable estoppel
when the de fendant s' n
i tentional misconduct causes the plaint iffto miss the fil n
i g deadl n
ie .
See Kelley,79 F.3d at 12 47 ; Goodhand, 40 F 3d
. at 2 13 ; English, 828 F.2d at 10 49.
The Supreme Court in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 ( 1990) ,how 
e ver ,noted in dictum that equitable estoppel should be treated as a form of equitable toll n
ig .
See 498 U.S. at 96. In any e vent ,the courts agree that equitable exceptions ni a suit against
the go v
e rnment ,whate v
er they are called ,should be sparingly applied . See infranotes 130 3
-2
and accompany n
i g text.
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sure that equitable tolling is applied only in exceptional cases. Sec
tion III.B also offers some applications of those standards · to
illustrate how the doctrine remains faithful to section 14.9(a) in
most cases but allows a departure from the text where justified. Fi
nally, section III.C demonstrates that by applying the doctrine of
equitable tolling, a district court gave fit disposition to a suit
brought under the Act.
A.

Both Rhyme and Reason: The Need for Equitable Tolling in
Claims under the FTCA

The doctrine of equitable tolling addresses the concerns of both
fair play and circumspection. This doctrine allows courts to over
look the expiration of the limitations period, but only in cases
where the facts and justice warrant such a result.
The Ninth Circuit, though it created a per se rule that does not
comport with applicable law, followed the time-honored tradition
of trying to protect unwitting plaintiffs. Cases where an agency
sends the notice of denial to a claimant in a deliberate attempt to
delay her filing of a lawsuit, for example, would justifiably catch the
conscience of a court. A claimant might also deserve relief in cases
where the claimant and her attorney strive mightily to preserve
their legal rights but miss the limitations period because the notice
was sent to the claimant and lost.107 As the Sixth Circuit notes, the
claimant often is not to blame when the course of judicial redress
does not run smooth:

[B] y setting short time limitation periods and establishing a maze of
regulatory appeals, the government virtually assures that any but the
most astute [claimant] will find his or her claim barred by some proce
dural technicality once he or she gets to the United States District
Court. We . . . believe these plaintiffs should be able to pursue their
individual claims.1 08

The Ninth Circuit advances this notion not wisely but too well.
Courts do need to have a measure of flexibility in deciding whether
or not to apply statutes of limitations in order to "further the inter
ests of justice."109 If a defendant sent the notice of denial to a
claimant in a deliberate attempt to hinder her suit, for example,
fairness to the plaintiff would warrant withholding enforcement of
the statute of limitations.
But courts should not allow the exception to swallow the rule.
The Ninth Circuit's per se rule against sending notice to repre107. See, e.g., McCaffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 122710, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 1996).
108. Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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sented claimants encompasses all such claimants, regardless of the
wherefores of their untimely filing. A claimant who let the limita
tions period expire out of sheer forgetfulness or even apathy, for
example, would still benefit from the rule. That the Ninth Circuit
spurns the clear language of section 14 .9(a) to secure such an over
broad result is the most unkindest cut of all. By substituting the
doctrine of equitable tolling, on the other hand, a court can deter
mine on a case-by-case basis whether the sending of notice to a rep
resented claimant justifies a departure from the license of 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.9(a).110 The principles of equitable tolling, unlike the Ninth
Circuit's per se rule, give courts the ability to permit technically
time-barred suits only when doing so would serve the interests of
justice.
Because of this selectivity, courts would be more comfortable
with the equitable tolling alternative. The courts, far from agreeing
that the gentler gamester is the soonest winner, are generally strict
in requiring compliance with statutes of limitations:
Procedural requirements . . . for gaining access to the federal courts
are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for par
ticular litigants. . . . " [I] n the long run, experience teaches us that strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature
is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the Iaw." 111

A court that believes that as a matter of course it must be cruel only
to be kind would likely reject a per se rule that disregards the stat
ute of limitations in every case where a represented claimant re
ceived notice. Even a more lenient court would probably take
exception to a rule that allows undeserving claimants to profit. If
courts instead followed the guidelines of equitable tolling already
laid out by the judiciary, they could allow an untimely suit to pro
ceed only when the facts of the case warrant such a result.
B.

The Happy Few: The Protocol of Equitable Tolling under
the Act

The courts have with right and conscience recognized the need
for equitable tolling in actions under the FTCA. Dealing estab
lished precedent a very palpable hit, the Supreme Court held in
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs112 that statutes of limita
tions in suits against the government, like those in actions against
private defendants, may be equitably tolled.11 3 The majority of
110. See, e.g., McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710.
111. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (quoting Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993).
112. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
113. See 498 U.S. at 95-96. Before lnvin, courts had uniformly held that the statutory
time limits in the FfCA were jurisdictional in nature and therefore could not be waived,
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courts have since interpreted Irwin to mean that statutory time lim
its in most suits against the government,114 including actions under
the FTCA,115 are not jurisdictional prerequisites and are therefore
subject to waiver, equitable tolling, and estoppel.116
A court wishing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling can go
about its business straight, because the judiciary has already clearly
specified when a court should utilize equitable tolling in an FTCA
case. In Irwin, the Supreme Court limited equitable tolling to cases
where "the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by
filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the
complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's miscon
duct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."117 The circuit courts,
agreeing that equitable tolling is an "exceptional doctrine" gener
ally available only to vigilant or deceived parties,118 have clarified
Irwin by specifying factors that weigh in favor of equitable tolling.
These factors include the plaintiff's reasonable lack of knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the filing requirements; her reasonable
ness in remaining unaware of the proper filing procedures; her dili
gence in pursuing her legal rights; and the absence of prejudice to
the defendant if the case is allowed to proceed.119
tolled, or estopped. See, e.g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); Gould v.
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990); Burns v. United
States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985).
114. Although lnvin dealt with a Title VII employment discrimination action, the Court's
holding has since been applied to a plethora of other types of suits against the United States.
See, e.g., Fadem v. United States, 52 F.3d 202 (9th Cir. 1995) (Quiet Title Act); Anderson v.
Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302 (8th Cir. 1995) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Wilson
v. United States, 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994) (Public Vessels Act and Suits in Admiralty Act);
Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) (Civil Service Reform Act); Catawba
Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Tucker Act); Goldbach v. Sulli
van, 779 F. Supp. 9 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (Equal Access to Judgment Act). But see Webb v.
United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the presumption of equitable tolling
does not apply in tax refund cases).
v.

115. The first circuit court to apply lnvin to the FTCA was the Eighth Circuit, in Schmidt
United States, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991). The court found that "necessary to [Invin's]

expressed holding is an implied holding that strict compliance with the statute of limitations
is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suing the government." 933 F.2d at 640. Other circuit
courts have since concurred. See, e.g., Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 213-14 (7th
Cir. 1994); Glamer v. Department of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994);
Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1991). In several cases,
however, the Fifth Circuit has disregarded lnvin and held that the FTCA time limits remain
jurisdictional and unwaivable. See Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998);
Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 54 (5th Cir. 1995).
116. See Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640; Glamer, 30 F.3d at 701; Goodhand, 40 F.3d at 213-14;
cf. Warren v. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, 724 F.2d 776, 778
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the regulations promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2672, i.e. 28
C.F.R.§§ 14.1-14.11, are not jurisdictional prerequisites).

117. lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96; see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
151 (1984).
118. See Wilson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1994).
119. See, e.g., Kelley v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996); Glamer v. Department
of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1994).
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In short, the courts recognize that the patient must minister to
herself. They will not extend equitable tolling to cases involving
inexcusable or "garden variety" neglect,120 where the claimant
"failed to exercise due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights." 121
For instance, a plaintiff would probably not receive the benefits of
equitable tolling if she just forgot to give the notice to the earnest
advocate she hired to plead for her. Similarly, the courts would
almost certainly refuse to forgive a missed deadline if the claimant
gave the notice to her attorney but the attorney simply did not file
in time. The result of a case like Graham, where the claimant acci
dentally throws the notice away,122 is more difficult to predict. Gra
ham's failure to exercise due diligence - to examine her mail at
least cursorily and refrain from discarding letters from the agency
with which she filed a claim - might prevent her from reaping the
benefits of equitable tolling.123 On the other hand, a court applying
the principles of equitable tolling might examine Graham's educa
tional and personal background, as well as her probable expectation
that all notices would be sent to her attorney, and determine that
her throwing away the notice did not sink to the level of "garden
variety" neglect.124 So long as the claimant exercised the diligence
120. Black's Law Dictionary defines "excusable neglect" as
a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's
own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in con
sequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the
care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990). It adds that at least for purposes of a motion
to vacate judgment, excusable neglect is "that neglect which might have been the act of a
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances." Id.; see also United States v. York
Elec. Constr. Co., 25 F R.D. 478, 479 (D. N.D. 1960).
121. lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96; see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151; John
son v. United States Postal Serv., 64 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1995); Arigo v. United States, 980
F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1992).
122. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 447 {9th Cir. 1996).
123. See lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96 ("We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving
late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.");
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot in
voke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.").
The Ninth Circuit's description of the facts does not suggest that Graham failed to see the
notice of denial. The majority indicates that the claimant "did not realize the import of the
denial," which implies that Graham read or at least saw the letter. See Graham, 96 F.3d at
447. In a more generous reading of the facts, Graham might have assumed that the notice
she received was simply a copy of a notice sent to her attorney. A "reasonably prudent
person under [those] circumstances," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990), how
ever, would have confirmed with her attorney sometime in the months after she received the
notice that the attorney had indeed received a copy, or at least questioned whether the attor
ney had everything she needed to file suit. Cf Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir.
1988) ("The mistake [of counsel] cannot be characterized as unique or extraordinary. . . . No
one checked to ensure that a notice of appeal was filed when the deadline approached. To
find excusable neglect on these facts would run roughshod over our existing precedent.").
124. Cf Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 392
(1993) ("Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do
not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect, it is clear that 'excusable neglect' under (FRCP]
.
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due in her particular situation, the courts may consider equitable
tolling as an alternative to dismissal for untimely filing.
Applying this due-diligence criterion, the courts have indicated
that they will toll the limitations period when the plaintiff reason
ably relied on deceptive or obstructionist conduct of the defend
ant125 and for other circumstances where the claimant's failure to
meet the filing deadline was beyond her control.126 Given the
Ninth Circuit's focus on an agency's knowledge that the claimant is
represented,127 a court applying the doctrine to a FfCA suit might
also require the attorney to have taken measures to inform the
agency of her representation, and the agency to have acknowledged
that representation. The courts might toll a limitations period, for
instance, if an agency intentionally mails the notice to the claimant
in the hope that the letter would never be forwarded to the known
attorney, and its plan succeeds.128 This justification for equitable
tolling would not extricate Graham from her plight, unfortunately,
because the Graham majority found that the Bureau's mailing of
the notice to Graham was inadvertent.129 As a more mundane ex
ample, equitable tolling might also be well thought upon in a case
where an agency accidentally sends notice to the claimant, but due
to some clerical error by the agency the claimant's attorney is un
able to confirm, despite her best efforts, that the notice was sent at
all.
The courts should not think meet to put a forgiving disposition
on for every represented claimant who files untimely after directly
receiving a notice of denial. Because "[t]he certainty and repose
[that statutes of limitations] confer would be lost if their application
is up for grabs in every case,"130 courts should utilize equitable toll
ing carefully and only in limited circumstances.131 In the context of
suits against the government, some courts apply the doctrine of eqRule 6(b) is a somewhat 'elastic concept' and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by
circumstances beyond the control of the movant.").
125. See Kelley v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1238, 1247-48 (1st Cir. 1996); Goodhand v. United
States, 40 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1994); Niccolai v. United States Bureau of Prisons, Director,
4 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 1993).
126. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151; Kelley, 79 F.3d at 1248 ("out of
[the plaintiff's] hands"); Niccolai, 4 F.3d at 693; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1550 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("extraordinary events which are beyond plaintiffs' control").
127. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448.
128. Of course, the significant evidentiary issue of the defendant's intent would have to
be resolved by the court.
129. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448.
130. English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987).
131. See Kelley, 79 F.3d at 1247; Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275
(10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1988).
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uitable tolling even more sparingly.132 Unless the facts surrounding
the mailing of the notice of denial satisfy the requirements for the
application of equitable tolling, the court should follow the tradi
tional interpretation of section 14.9(a) and uphold the agency's
mailing to the claimant.
By applying these principles to the facts of a particular FfCA
action, a court can ease the winter of a deserving plaintiff's discon
tent without creating a glorious summer for everyone else. Absent
an extraordinary state of affairs, the court would remain faithful to
the language of and intent behind 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), as well as to
the doctrines of judicial deference to agency interpretations of stat
utes and their own regulations. Because courts would apply equita
ble tolling only in exceptional situations, the regulation's "or"
would still have meaning in the vast majority of cases.
C.

Thus Hath the Course of Justice Whirled About: The Sound
Application of Equitable Tolling in McCaffrey v. Nylon

The even-handed justice of equitable tolling has already been
applied successfully to the notice provisions of the Act and 28
C.F.R. § 14.9(a). In 1996, a U.S. district court considered an issue
and facts similar to those of Graham. 133 The National Park Service
had been communicating with the claimants' attorney, but then
broke its promise to notify the attorney of its final decision on their
administrative claim.134 The evidence also showed that the claim
ants never received the notice sent directly to them by the
agency.135 While acknowledging that the agency had discharged its
obligation under the Act when it mailed the notice to the claimant,
the court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling and allowed the
plaintiffs to proceed despite the late filing of their suit.136
The court justifiably held that the facts warranted the equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs were both diligent
and misled;137 they were not to blame for their failure to file \vithin
the statutory time limits.138 Citing Irwin and finding that this was
132. See, e.g., Kelley, 79 F3d at 1248 ("It is axiomatic that '[t]he grounds for tolling stat
utes of limitations are more limited in suits against the government.'" (quoting Swietlik v.
United States, 779 F.2d 1306, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985))).
133. See McCaffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 122710, at *1·2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 1996).
134. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2.
135. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2.
136. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *1-2.
137. See Wtlson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1994) (declining to apply
equitable tolling in a case where the plaintiff had failed to exercise due diligence and was not
misled by the government defendant).
138. Compare McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *1-2 with Yillah v. United States, No.
CIV.A.98-2842, 1998 WL 661545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998), in which the court found an
FTCA plaintiff undeserving of equitable relief. In response to a motion to dismiss for un-
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"not a case in which a litigant 'failed to exercise due diligence in
preserving his legal rights,' " the court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss the untimely suit.139 Significantly, the court noted that sec
tion 14.9(a) does not oblige the government to send notice to claim
ant's counsel.140 Such a holding would have been mercy, but too
much security: all represented claimants to whom the agency sent
notice would then have been entitled to a tolling of the limitations
period, regardless of the reason for their failure to file timely or
their own fault therein.141 By using the doctrine of equitable tolling
instead of subsuming all claimants under a "one-size-fits-all" rule,
the district court bent justice to its awe without breaking it all to
pieces.
CONCLUSION
Courts should follow the traditional, literal reading of 28 C.F.R.

§ 14.9(a), which allows an agency to send the FTCA notice of de

nial to either a claimant or her attorney, even if the claimant is rep
resented. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's per se rule requiring that
agencies send notice only to the attorney, the traditional reading
grows in a fair consent with the doctrine of judicial deference to
agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regulations, the
plain language of section 14.9(a), the established precepts of statu
tory construction and the intent of the regulation's drafters. An
agency choosing to send notice to a represented claimant does not
violate the ethical rule against direct contact with represented per
sons, because the communication is authorized by law, the regula
tion itself.
In exceptional situations that justify a departure from the text of
section 14.9(a) - where the claimant's suit is filed late because the
agency sent the denial notice to the claimant even though justice
and fairness, given the facts, would clearly require the agency to
send notice to the attorney - the court may equitably toll the
FTCA's statute of limitations to allow an otherwise-untimely suit to
proceed. The equitable tolling approach departs from the traditimely filing, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant agency's use of permissive ("suit may be
filed") rather than mandatory language in its notice of denial inadequately notified his coun
sel of the limitations period, thereby entitling the plaintiff to equitable relief. See 1998 WL
661545, at *3. Tue court found this argument "implausible," noting that "[e]ven a cursory
reading of the relevant statutory provisions should have alerted counsel to inquire [with the
agency] as to the actual status of the claim and whether Mr. Ytllah's statutory rights were
being affected." 1998 WL 661545, at *3. Refusing to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling,
the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 1998 WL 661545, at

*3-4.
139. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
140. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2.
141. See supra sections III.A and 111.B.
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tional reading of section 14.9(a) only in the most extraordinary and
specific of circumstances. A court utilizing this doctrine, therefore,
remains faithful for the most part to the precepts of judicial defer
ence, the text of the regulation, the rules of statutory construction,
and the drafters' intent. One district court has already successfully
used equitable tolling in the FTCA context, correctly giving relief
to a deserving plaintiff while at the same time avoiding the over
breadth of a per se rule.
The ability to achieve an equitable result in a specific case while
considering only the facts of that case is a consummation devoutly
to be wished. Such a solution accords section 14.9(a) itself and ap
plicable case law, and serves the interests of claimants without un
duly restricting the courts. Therefore let every court now task its
thought, that this fair action may on foot be brought.142

142. Selections from SHAKESPEARE: T HE C OMPLETE W orucs appear throughout this
Note. Under these circumstances, bluebooking is a custom more honored in the breach than
in the observance.

